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Abstract: In this paper we show how an upstream firm can prevent destruc-
tive competition among downstream firms producing relatively close substitutes by
implementing a price-dependent profit-sharing rule. The rule also ensures that the
downstream firms undertake investments which benefit the industry in aggregate.
The model is consistent with observations from the market for content commodities
distributed by mobile networks.
1 Introduction
The Bertrand paradox may provide a plausible explanation why the majority of the
content commodities on the Internet are oﬀered for free (marginal costs). The rival
is just “one click away”, and competing content providers have strong incentives to
undercut each other as long as there are positive profit margins. In contrast, we
observe that prices for mobile phone content commodities like ring tones, football
goal alerts and jokes are well above marginal costs (the sales value of such services in
Norway in 2006 was twice as high as the total value of Internet ads). One potential
explanation why the Bertrand paradox is not observed for such goods, is the price-
dependent profit-sharing rule used by some upstream mobile access providers. The
rule implies that the upstream firms charge a share of the end-user price per unit
of content instead of for instance a unit wholesale price from the content providers.
The crucial feature of this rule is that the share accruing to a given content provider
is increasing in the end-user price. The table below shows the profit-sharing rule
used by the dominant Norwegian mobile operator Telenor; if a content provider sells
his good for 1 NOK he receives 45 % of the revenue, while he receives 80 % if he
sells the good for 70 NOK.1
End-user price (NOK) 1.0 1.5 3 5 10 20 70
Share to the content provider 45% 54.% 62% 66% 68% 70% 80%
In the formal model we consider an upstream firm selling an input (access) to
downstream firms producing diﬀerentiated services. The upstream firm determines
the access conditions, while the downstream firms decide end-user prices and in-
vestments in for instance marketing. We show that by using a price-dependent
profit-sharing rule, the upstream firm induces the retailers to behave as if demand
has become less price elastic. A price-dependent profit-sharing rule is suﬃcient to
1In addition to this revenue-sharing rule, the content providers are charged a fixed fee (but no
unit wholesale price). Strand (2004) emphasizes that the revenue-sharing scheme creates incentives
to promote new services. The Norwegian business model is now widely taken up in Europe and
Asia (Strand, 2004).
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achieve the vertical integration outcome also in presence of investment spillovers. A
fixed fee determines the allocation of the total industry profit.
The upstream firm could alternatively use a combination of resale price main-
tenance (RPM), a fixed fee and a wholesale price below marginal costs to achieve
the vertical integration outcome (see Mathewson and Winter, 1984). The Bertrand
paradox is then avoided by indirectly limiting the retailers’ strategy choices. The
novelty in the above proposal is that the sharing-scheme reduces the undercutting
incentives among retailers directly by reducing the perceived price elasticity, and is
less likely to raise anti-trust concerns compared to RPM .2
2 The Model
We consider an upstream firm selling an input to n downstream firms. The demand
curve faced by downstream firm i = 1, ..., n is given by qi = qi(p), where p is the
vector of prices charged by the n downstream firms. We assume that the demand
functions are well behaved and downward sloping in own price (∂qi/∂pi < 0). The
consumers perceive the goods sold by the downstream firms as imperfect substitutes
(∂qi/∂pj > 0).
Marginal costs both at the upstream and downstream levels are set equal to zero;
however, this does not matter for the qualitative results. Hence, we can write total
operating profit in the industry as
Π(p) =
nX
i=1
piqi(p). (1)
Below, we consider a two-stage game where the upstream firm at stage 1 deter-
mines the conditions for access to the upstream good, and where the downstream
firms subsequently compete in prices. In Section 3 we extend the model by allowing
the downstream firms to make market-expanding investments.
2Moreover, with RPM the retail prices are not decided by the players with hands on market
experience. This may obviously be detrimental to the total channel outcome.
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The upstream firm uses a two-part tariﬀ, consisting of a fixed fee F and a profit-
sharing rule. We specify the profit-sharing rule such that downstream firm i keeps a
share β(pi) of its operating profit, while the upstream firm gets the share (1−β(pi)).
We later show that β0(pi) > 0.3
Stage 2
The operating profit of downstream firm i equals πi(p) = β(pi)piqi, and at the
last stage each downstream firm solves p∗i = argmaxπi. This yields the FOCs
∙
q∗i + p
∗
i
∂qi
∂pi
¸
+
β0(p∗i )
β(p∗i )
p∗i q
∗
i = 0. (2)
The second term in (2) would vanish if β were constant (β0 = 0), in which
case we would get the standard result that a profit maximizing price pˆi satisfies
[qˆi + pˆi
∂qi
∂pi
] = 0. With β0 > 0 the second term on the left-hand side of equation (2)
is positive, implying that the marginal profit at any given price is higher than if
β0 = 0. This induces each of the downstream firms to behave less aggressively, and
we can state:
Proposition 1: The profit-maximizing prices will be higher for β0(pi) > 0 com-
pared to β0(pi) = 0.
By defining εii ≡ piqi
∂qi
∂pi
as the price elasticity of demand for good i, we can rewrite
(2) as
ε∗ii = −
µ
1 +
β0(p∗i )
β(p∗i )
p∗i
¶
(3)
Equation (3) characterizes the profit-maximizing equilibrium price for firm i. It
is well known that revenue - and thus profit for a firm facing zero marginal costs -
other things equal is maximized by choosing a price for which the elasticity is equal
to minus one. However, since
β0(p∗i )
β(p∗i )
p∗i > 0, we see from (3) that the profit sharing
rule induces the downstream service provider to behave as if the demand has become
less price elastic. This confirms that the profit-maximizing prices will be higher if
β0 > 0 than if β0 = 0:
3In contrast to the present paper, the literature on revenue-sharing as a vertical restraint con-
ventionally assumes that the revenue share is a constant; i.e. β0 = 0 (see e.g. Lal, 1990).
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Proposition 2: A profit-sharing rule β0(pi) > 0 reduces the perceived elasticity
of demand for the downstream firms, making them behave less aggressively.
In the sequel we assume an isoelastic sharing rule so that βi(pi) = θpλi , where
λ is the elasticity parameter determined by the upstream firm at stage 1 (for the
moment we treat θ as a positive scalar). With this specification we can reformulate
(2) and (3) as
(1 + λ) q∗i + p
∗
i
∂qi
∂pi
= 0 (4)
ε∗ii = − (1 + λ) (5)
Stage 1
The upstream firm will use λ to induce the downstream firms to set the prices
that maximize total industry profit. The fixed fee F is then used as a profit distri-
bution parameter. Thus, we first derive the hypothetical equilibrium under vertical
integration (V I). Solving pi = argmaxΠ(p) yields the FOCs
∙
qi + pi
∂qi
∂pi
¸
+
X
j 6=i
pj
∂qj
∂pi
= 0 (i = 1, ..., n). (6)
The term in the square bracket of (6) measures the marginal profit on good i and is
analogous to the term in the square bracket of (2). The second term of (6) internal-
izes the horizontal pecuniary externality when products are imperfect substitutes.
Let ωpji = −
∂qj
∂pi
Á
∂qi
∂pi
measure the increased demand for good j per unit reduction
in the demand for good i when pi increases. The higher these ratios, the higher pi
should be set in order to maximize aggregate industry profit. The challenge for the
upstream firm in a vertically separated market structure is to set conditions inducing
the downstream firms to internalize this eﬀect at stage 2.
Inserting for ωpji into (6) we can now characterize industry optimum as
qi +
"
pi −
X
j 6=i
pjω
p
ji
#
∂qi
∂pi
= 0. (i = 1, ..., n).
By imposing symmetry this expression can be reformulated as (with subscript V I
for vertical integration)
qV I + pV I
£
1 − (n− 1)ωpji
¤ ∂qi
∂pi
= 0. (7)
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The optimal value of λ ensures that aggregate profit is the same in the verti-
cally separated market structure as in the hypothetical equilibrium with vertical
integration. This value can be found by using equations (4) and (7) and setting
q∗i /p∗i = qV I/pV I .4 We then have
λ = λ∗ ≡ −1 + 1
1− (n− 1)ωpji
. (8)
Inserting for (8) into (5) we further find
ε∗ii = −
1
1− (n− 1)ωpji
.
If a price reduction of good i does not aﬀect demand for good j, we have
∂qj
∂pi
=
ωpji = 0. The downstream firms thus choose prices such that ε
∗
ii = −1, which is
optimal also from the industry’s point of view (λ∗ = 0). However, if the goods are
imperfect substitutes (such that
∂qj
∂pi
> 0), each downstream firm fully internalizes
the eﬀect its price has on the profit of the other firms when λ = λ∗ > 0. Hence,
the downstream firms will not engage in destructive price competition even if they
produce close substitutes, and the Bertrand paradox is avoided:5
Proposition 3: The profit-sharing rule βi(pi) = θpλi with λ = λ
∗ solves the
Bertrand paradox, and induces the downstream firms to maximize aggregate industry
profit.
3 Market-expanding investments with spillovers
We now extend the model to allow each downstream firm to undertake market-
expanding (or quality-enhancing) investments with potential spillovers. At the out-
set, it is not clear how one firm’s investments aﬀect sales and profits of the other
4Setting q∗i /p
∗
i = qV I/pV I uniquely determines the prices, since qi/pi is monotonically decreas-
ing in pi when ∂qi/∂pi < 0.
5As long as the horizontal pecuniary externality is the only problem to solve, we see from (8)
that the scalar θ has no impact on the outcome (but in absence of the fixed fee it could be used as
an instrument to allocate aggregate industry profit).
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firms. The investing firm’s product will typically become relatively more attrac-
tive than those of the rivals. Thereby the latter could be harmed. However, there
might also be technological or marketing spillovers from an investment such that
one firm’s investment may be to the benefit of all the downstream firms. A given
firm’s marketing of ring tones, for instance, is also likely to benefit other firms selling
ring tone services. We thus open up for both positive and negative spillovers from
investments.
We assume that the downstream profit function of firm i net of any fixed fee is
given by
πi = β(pi)piqi(p, x)− φ(xi), (9)
where the new variable x denotes the vector of market-expanding investments un-
dertaken by the n downstream firms, and φ(xi) is the investment cost function. The
more a firm invests, the higher is the demand it faces; ∂qi/∂xi > 0.We assume that
φ0(xi) > 0, and that it is suﬃciently convex to satisfy all second-order conditions
for a profit maximum.
Total industry profit is now given by
Π (p, x) =
nX
i=1
[piqi(p, x)− φ(xi)] . (10)
The upstream firm determines the input conditions at stage 1, with θ and λ as
strategic variables, and at stage 2 the downstream firms decide non-cooperatively
on end-user prices and investment levels.
At stage 2 the first-order condition ∂πi/∂pi = 0 is given by equation (4). Simul-
taneously solving ∂πi/∂xi = 0 we further find
θ (p∗i )
λ+1 ∂qi
∂xi
= φ0(x∗i ). (11)
where θpλ+1i is the profit margin per unit sold.
To find the optimal profit-sharing rule at stage 1, we again use vertical integration
as a benchmark. Maximizing (10) with respect to xi we find the FOCs
pi
∂qi
∂xi
+
X
j 6=i
pj
∂qj
∂xi
= φ0(xi) (i = 1, ..., n). (12)
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If there were no investment spillovers the term ∂qj/∂xi would in general be neg-
ative, and more so the closer horizontal substitutes the goods. This eﬀect, which
will not be taken into account by independent downstream firms, tends to generate
overinvestments in a decentralized market structure. However, if one firm’s invest-
ment increases demand also for its rivals, we have ∂qj/∂xi > 0. This is more likely
to be the case the poorer horizontal substitutes the goods are and the stronger the
investment spillovers.
Analogous to our procedure above, we define ωxji =
∂qj
∂xi
Á
∂qi
∂xi
. The variable ωxji
measures the increase in demand for good j per unit change in the demand for good
i resulting from a higher investment by downstream firm i. With perfect spillovers
an investment by firm i benefits all firms equally (∂qi/∂xi = ∂qj/∂xi > 0), and we
then have ωxji = 1. Otherwise we have ωxji < 1 (and ωxji is negative if ∂qj/∂xi < 0 ∀i).
Imposing symmetry, we can now reformulate (12) as
pV I
£
1 + (n− 1)ωxji
¤ ∂qi
∂xi
= φ0(xi). (13)
The first-order condition ∂Π/∂pi = 0 is given by equation (7), and thus λ∗
in equation (8) still applies. Clearly, aggregate profit is maximized also in the
decentralized market structure if it yields the same prices and investment levels as
under vertical integration. We can therefore use equations (11) and (13) to find that
the upstream firm at stage 1 should set
θ = θ∗ =
1 + (n− 1)ωxji
pλ∗V I
. (14)
Abstracting from the distribution of the fixed fee F, the downstream firms’ partici-
pation constraint requires that θ > 0 (c.f. equation (9)). The range of permissible
values for θ∗ is thus in the interval (0, n/pλ
∗
V I ]. In the extreme case where an invest-
ment by one downstream firm increases its demand by as much as the other firms
loose in sales (∂qi/∂xi = − (n− 1) ∂qj/∂xi), the investment is a waste of resources
from the industry’s point of view. Then the upstream firm should set θ∗ close to zero.
In the other extreme case, where we have perfect technological spillovers (ωxji = 1),
we see that θ∗ = n/pλ
∗
V I . More generally, the upstream firm should specify a profit-
sharing rule which gives each downstream firm a higher profit margin, as captured
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by θ∗, the more beneficial its investments are for its rivals.
We can state:
Proposition 4: The profit-sharing rule βi(pi) = θpλi with λ = λ
∗ and θ =
θ∗ yields the downstream firms pricing and investment incentives which maximize
industry profit.
4 Concluding Remarks
A major problem in many network industries is that firms may end up with de-
structive competition because they produce relatively close substitutes. This may
prevent the firms from undertaking investments which could benefit the industry
in aggregate. Such an outcome can be avoided by implementing a profit-shifting
rule which reduces the downstream firms’ perceived elasticity of demand. Optimal
investment levels are ensured by giving the downstream firms an appropriate profit
margin that depends on how one firm’s investments aﬀect its rivals.
Another merit of our approach is that it is easy to implement when marginal costs
are low, since profit sharing then approaches revenue sharing. A general limitation
of revenue sharing is the costs of monitoring the retailer’s revenue (Cachon and
Lariviere, 2005, and Dana and Spier, 2001). In the case at hand, this problem is
rarely significant, since the upstream mobile provider collects the revenue from the
end users (but it is the content providers who decide end user prices).
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